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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
March 16, 1979 Conference 
L-ist 3, Sheet 3 
No. 78-1177 
WHITE MOUNTAIN 
APACHE TRIBE, et al. 
v. 
BRACKER, et al (Ariz. 
state officials) 
Cert. to Ariz. Ct. App. 
(Eubank, Jacobson, Ogg) 
State/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Petitioners contend that various federal statutes 
preclude Arizona from collecting diesel fuel and gross receipts 
taxes from non-indian logging operations performed on an indian 
I 
reservation under contract with an indian lumber company. 
I -
i -
FACTS AND DECISION BELmv: Petitioners are a federally recog-
nized !ndian I tribe and two non- ~ ndian companies who partic i pate 
--L. 
i 
in a joint 7 nture named Pinetop Logginyf company. 




law, the indians have created a lumber company named FATCO. 
FATCO operates a lumber operation on the tribe's reservation 
which is the major source of revenues for the tribal govern-
ment. Under contract with FATCO, Pinetop cuts timber on the 
reservation and hauls it to the sawmill by truck. Pinetop has 
no operations in Arizona except on the reservation. 
Timber on indian reservations is owned by the United States 
for the benefit of the indians. FATCO's operations are con-
ducted pursuant to a contract with the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) , and the terms of Fli.TCO' s contract with Pinetop are dic-
tated by BIA. All of FATCO' s · operations, including those per-
formed by Pinetop, are subject to pervasive regulation by BIA. 
BIA actually designates the trees to be cut, and fixes the speed 
limits for Pinetops trucks. BIA's authority to approve or dis-
approve Pinetop's contract with FATCO allows it to control the 
price charged for Pinetop's services 
The roads on the reservation result from the efforts of 
three parties: the state, the tribe, and Pinetop itself. The 
state contributes nothing to the construction and maintenance of 
roads built by the tribe or Pinetop. In the course of its oper-
ations, Pinetop principally uses roads built by itself and the 
tribe, but it sometimes travels for short distances over state 
roads. 
Arizona imposes two taxes to pay for building and maintain-
ing highways: a tax on sales of diesel fuel, and a tax on motor 
( 
- 3 -
vehicle contract carriers calculated at 2.5% of gross receipts. 
When Pinetop initially contracted to do logging for FATCO in 
1969, the contract price was established on the basis of the 
expectation that it would not be required to pay these taxes in 
connection with its 0perations. In 1971, Arizona demanded pay-
ment of the fuel and carrier taxes in connection with Pinetop's 
operations, and Pinetop and FATCO agreed that FATCO would pay 
any taxes for which Pinetop ultimately was held liable. 
Pinetop paid and has continued to pay the taxes under pro-
test, and commenced this action in 2n Arizona court for a refund 
and a declaration that it was immune from the fuel and carrier 
taxes by operation of various federal statutes relating to 
indians. The challenge is limited to taxes allocable to opera-
tions over tribal and Pinetop roads: the company keeps accurate 
records of its use of state roads and concedes the propriety of 
the taxes allocable to that use. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 
First, the Court of Appeals held that the Arizona Enabling 
Act, which in terms deprived Arizona of all right, title and 
jurisdiction of indian reservations, does not preclude state 
taxation of non-indians, even in connection with activities on 
reservations. Second, the court found that the taxes were not 
barred by 25 C.F.R. § 1.4, which exempts property belonging to 
indians from all state laws regarding the regulation and devel-
c 
opment of property. 
levied on Pinetop's 
indian property. 
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The court explained that the taxes were 
business activities, not on the use of 
Third, the court held that the taxes were not preempted by 
the pervasive regulation of indian lumbering operations by BIA 
and Congress. It asserted that the federal regulations demon-
strated no concern for the prices charged by Pinetop, that there 
was no evidence of federal intent to oust state authority 
respecting the commercial activities of non-indians, and that 
the taxes would not impede FATCO' s lumbering business so ser-
iously as to conflict with the administration of any federal 
program. Finally, petitioners contended that the taxes would 
interfere with the tribal government in various ways, but the 
court dismissed the asserted interference as "more imaginary 
than real." 
CONTENTIONS: Petitioners make the following contentions: 
1. This case gives this Court its first opportunity to rule 
on the extent to which state taxation of lumbering operations on 
indian rese%ations is preempted by federal law, and this is a 
question of immense economic importance to indians. 
2. The state taxes are preempted by the pervasive federal 
regulation of indian lumbering, under Warren Trading Post v. 
Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). There, this 
Court held that federal law preempted an Arizona transaction tax 
as applied to a non-indian doing business as an indian trader on 
- 5 -
an indian reservation. As in this case, the Court stressed that 
the trader's operations were subject to pervasive regulation .for 
the benefit of the indians, and in particular that the taxes 
would interfere with the policies served by federal control of 
the prices charged by the trader. 
3. The taxes are contrary to the Arizona Enabling Act. The 
Enabling Act imposes at least some 1 imi ts on Arizona's govern-
mental authority with respect to reservations. Thus, it imposes 
limits on state criminal jurisdiction, and prohibits state 
income taxation of indians living on the reservation, McClanahan 
v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1973} 
(dictum}. The lower court erred in disregarding the regulatory 
impact of the taxes with respect to the use of indian land. 
4. 25 C.F.R. § 1.4, prohibiting the application of state law 
regulating the use and development of p"roperty to indian pro-
perty, prohibits these taxes because they interfere with the 
development of the reservation. Other courts have held that the 
regulation applies to use of tribal property even by non-indians. 
5. The taxes are proh ibted under Wi 11 i ams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 
218, 220 (1959} which prohibited states from interfering with 
tribal government. Thus, they infringe on the tribe's control 
of its roads, its managament of its timber, and its ability to 
tax. 
Respondents makes the following contentions: 




cannot preempt state taxation of non-indians doing business with 
the tribe. Thus, Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes, 425 u.s. 463 {1976) sustained application of a Montana 
cigarette tax on sales by an indian business to non-indians. 
Further, Kahn v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 16 Ariz. App. 17, 
490 P. 2d 846 {1871), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial 
federal question, 411 u.s. 941 {1973), sustained imposition of 
the Arizona income tax on a non-indian attorney who derived all 
of his income from work for the Navaj~ Tribe, subject to federal 
statutes and regulations governing contracts with indian tribes. 
2. The Arizona Emabling Act only precludes Arizona from 
asserting a property interest in indian property, and numerous 
decisions of this Court hold that it or similar acts do not res-
trict state jurisdiction over non-indians on indian reserva-
tions. The taxes fall solely on non-indians who happen to do 
business on the reservation, and do not regulate the use of 
indian land. 
3. 25 C.F.R. § 1.4 only prohibits the application of tradi-
tional land use regulations to indian property. In any event, 
the regulation is invalid because it is not authorized by any 
statute. 
4. The fact that the taxes result in an indirect economic 
burden on the tribe does not constitute an impermissible 
infringement on tribal government. 
DISCUSSION: The contentions that taxes on ·diesel fuel and 
- 7 -
contract carriage by non-indians are impermissible regulations 
of the use of indian property or interfere with tribal govern-
ment seem insubstantial. 
There is some plausibility to the argument that the taxes 
are preempted as a result of pervasive federal regulation of all 
aspects of indian lumbering operations in light of the general 
federal policy that the reservation should be exploited for the 
benefit of the indians. Neither respondents nor the lower court 
deal convincingly with Warren Trading · Post. 
tainly has substantial practical importance. 
The question cer-
In any event, it would seem unwise to dispose of this peti-
tion one way or another without hearing from the Solicitor Gen-
eral. 
There is a response. 
3/6/79 Lacy Opn in petn 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM ) 
2Lf2._4,~~~(~~~~~ J 
~r-~~~ G-.-~ 
vv-~~~'!11 ~~' ::"':o"'1 el~ a..-~~~anuary 98~
wzA ~ ~6--(  ~- -
Gregory May ! f- t.--z._. ~ &t ~n1 ~, 
/11JL..~~~ (.A.~ ~b-v~H.....J..~ 
1-A/r~;:_ ~ 7~~~PlA--~ 
~: 78-1177: White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker 
No. 78-1604: Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax 
.. ~-'~vv~~~.~ Comm1sS10n -, - ----
~.~~~~~~ 
~~: ~~~~dA.L-~~ ~ 
Questions Presented ~ . ·~ 
h.-;~~~~~ 
~l-
1. Does federal regulation of ~'1u~ufEf').(·~Pt-, 
~k- -~ fC~ 
Mountain) and Indian trading (Central Mac e~o~ 
taxes that fall on certain non-Indians who engage in those 
~.
activities within an Indian reservation? In other words, are 
these cases controlled by Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona 
State Tax Commission, 380 u.s. 685 (1965)? 
2. Do the Arizona taxes on non-Indians who do business 
with the Indians impermissibly interfer with tribal self-
government? 
Facts 
These straight-lined cases raise the same legal 
issues, but they involve altogether different facts. Since the 
briefs state the facts rather well, this summary will try to 
draw some opinionated conclusions. --
I. White Mountain { ~ 
Petr Pinetop Logging Co. 
I 
t9-jt .) 
is a / non-Indian enterprise. 
It works as an independent contractor for FATCO, the Indian 
corporation that manages the lumbering interests of petr White 
Mountain Apache Tribe. The entire Indian 1 umbering operation, 
----------------~ 
including its contract with Pinetop, is extensively regulated 
and supervised by the BIA. Pinetop's job is to fell trees, cut 
them, and deliver them to FATCO's sawmills. An essential and 
expensive part of that job is the construction of roads through 
the forests on the reservation. These logging roads are 
constructed and maintained at the expense of Pinetop and FATCO 
without any help from the state. Pinetop also uses state roads 
within the reservation during the course of its operations, but 
taxes allocable to such use are not disputed. 
Arizona has levied two road use taxes against Pinetop. 
The first is called a<.motor c~x." It taxes all 
contract motor carriers of property at 2. 5% of their gross 
receipts. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-641 (1979 Supp.). The tax 
is conceived as a tax on the privilege of engaging in a business 
that makes inordinate use of public highways, see cases cited at 
Petr's Brief 13, and all revenues are ear-marked for maintenance 
and improvement of the state's highways. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 40-641(C). The second tax is called N uel use excise tax." 
It levies an $.08 per gallon exaction on all fuel used to propel 
a motor vehicle over a public highway within the state. Id. ~ 
28-1551 (4). The levy is "for the purpose of partially 
compensating the state for the use of its highways." Id. § 28-
1552. Under state law (and perhaps BIA regulations), the 
logging roads within the reservation are "public." Thus, the 
state holds Pinetop responsible for both taxes. The tribe has 
agreed to indemnify Pinetop for this unanticipated tax 
1 iabil i ty, but that contractual undertaking should not affect 
analysis of the case. The legal incidence of the tax is still 
on non-Indians, and the Indians probably would bear the economic 
incidence in any case. 
II. Central Machinery ( ~ o1 I l ~ ~~) 
Appl Central Machinery Co. is a non-Indian, Arizona 
corporation with a single place of business off the reservation. 
It is not a federally licensed Indian trader. In 1973, Central 
Machinery went onto the Gila River Indian Reservation and sold 
eleven farm tractors to a tribal farming enterprise called Gila 
River Farms. Contract, delivery, and payment were made within 
the reservation. The transaction was supervised and approved by 
local BIA officials. 
Arizona levies what it calls a 
"transaction privilege tax" on persons doing business within the 
state. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-1309. The tax exacts from 
retailers of tangible property an amount equal to 2% of "the 
gross proceeds of sales or gross income from the business." Id. 
§ 42-1312(A). In this case, the gross receipts tax on the 
tractor sale ($2,916.62) appeared as a separate item on the bill 
that Central Machinery gave to Gila River Farms. An early 
Interior Dep't opinion on the application of the tax to Indians 
also notes that, at that time, purchasers used token 
representing one mil to reimburse sellers for the Arizona gross 
receipts tax due on sales. 57 I.D. 124, discussed at Appe's 
Brief 27-28. The statutes themselves, however, contain no 
indication that this is a "sales" tax. And this Court's opinion 
in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 
685 (1965), treats the tax as if it were a tax on business. 
Accord, Arizona State Tax Commission v. Garrett Corp., 291 P.2d 
208 (Ariz. 1955); Arizona State Tax Commission v. Southwest 
Kenworth, Inc., 561 P.2d 757 (Ariz. App. 1977). Cf. Complete 
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); General Motors 
Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Norton v. Department 
of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951) (all involving state gross 
receipt or privilege taxes on interstate business). 
Gila River Farms paid the tax item on Central 
Machinery's bill under protest, and Central agreed to remit any 
recovery in this suit to Gila. Nevertheless, the legal 
incidence of the tax is on the non-Indian seller. Whether or 
not Arizona sellers routinely identify the tax as an item on 
their bills, the economic incidence of the tax probably is on 
buyers. 
Discussion 
In both cases, non-Indians claimed that Arizona could 
not tax their business with Indians. The Arizona courts 
rejected both claims. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax 
Commission, 380 u.s. 685 (1965) (hereinafter Warren), is the 
most relevant precedent. It involved the very tax at issue in 
Central Machinery. But White Mountain, rather than Central 
Machinery, is the case to which Warren most easily applies. 
White Mountain should be reversed; Central Machinery probably 
should be affirmed. 
I. White Mountain 
The taxpayer in Warren was a federally licensed Indian 
trader who kept store within a reservation. The Court held that 
the pervasive federal regulations governing trading with the 
Indians preempted the Arizona gross receipts tax assessed for 
the privilege of doing business within the state. "These 
apparently all-inclusive regulations and the statutes 
authorizing them," the Court said, "would seem in themselves 
sufficient to show that Congress had taken the business of 
Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room 
remains for state laws imposing additional burdens upon 
traders." 380 u.s. at 690. "[S] ince federal legislation has 
left the State with no duties or responsibilities respecting the 
reservation Indians," the Court continued, "we cannot believe 
that Congress intended to leave the State the privilege of 
levying this tax." Id. at 691. 
Warren seems rather clearly to call for the -invalidation of the contract carrier and fuel taxes imposed on -
~ Pinetop. (1) The federal regulations governing Indian lumbering 
~~ are just as pervasive as (arguably, more pervasive than) the 
~~~ regulations governing trading with the Indians. 
~rie~ (an exc-:llent review of the federal regulation of 
~ Indian timber). ( 2) Pinetop's allegedly taxable activities are 
~ conducted entirely within the reservation. 
See Petr's 
( 3 ) The allegedly 
taxable activities occur entirely on roads constructed and 
maintained by the Indians or their contractors. Since the state 
has no responsibility and incurs no expense for these roads, it 
cannot have the privilege of taxing Indian-related activities 
upon them. 
The last point, which builds 
~~j}~ 
J 
upon the last-quoted 
language from Warren, suggests a supportive argument that none 
of the parties mentions. A fundamental due process limitation 
upon a state's taxing jurisdiction is the notion that the state ---
must have given the taxpayer some benefit for which the tax can 
ask return. See, e.g. , Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Missouri 
State Tax Commission, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968); Wisconsin v. 
J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). Courts usually 
invoke this principle when they are asked to review the 
apportionment of state taxes on interstate business. But it 
seems apt in the present case. Since Arizona has nothing to do 
with the logging roads at issue here, its road use taxes ask 
return for a benefit never afforded. The counter argument, of 
course, is that the logging roads might have limited value if 
they did not connect to state highways. That may or may not be 
true on the facts. 
II. Central Machinery 
The taxpayer in Warren was trading with the Indians, 
and he was asked to pay the very tax now levied on Central 
Machinery. But there the similarity between Warren and Central 
Machinery ends. (1) Central Machinery is not in "the business 
of Indian trading on reservations." See Warren, 380 U.S. at 690 
(emphasis added). It has no federal license. Federal 
regulations do not govern the way in which it does business. 
(2) The transaction at issue here required no federal license. 
It was not subject to pervasive federal regulation. All 
-~
transaction required was the approval of the local BIA agents. 
That approval probably was directed more to the purchase--the 
expenditure of tribal resources--than to the sale. In short, 
Central Machinery simply engaged in a one-time sale to certain 
----'--
Indians. That its customers themselves are heavily regulation 
should make no difference. Nor should it matter that those 
customers are willing to transfer their tax immunity to Central 
Machinery by protesting a tax-based portion of the costs of 
doing business that were included in the sale price. 
The Indians probably had jurisdiction to tax Central 
Machinery for the privilege of making a sale within the 
reservation. This case might come out differently had they done 
so, although something more than the forthcoming dec is ion in 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colvill~ Indian 
Reservation, No. 7 8-630, would be necessary to support that 
result. But the obvious business considerations that now 
counsel the Indians not to tax those who trade with them would 
disappear if this Court held that sellers who make BIA-approved 
sales are immune from otherwise applicable state business taxes. 
Since the preemption analysis in Warren does not 
require reversal in this case, the Court must turn to the appl's 
argument that the state tax interfers with tribal self-
government. Appl's rather truncated argument on this point has 
-" 
9. 
two themes, both of which are unpersuasive. ( 1 ) Ar;>pl argues 
that a tax raising the price of farm equipment burdens the 
Indians' farming operation. Since the reservation was set aside 
for the very purpose of supporting Indian farming, it continue, 
the tax is inconsistent with federal pol icy. The response is 
obvious. The business tax at issue here is simply one of the 
It raises the price to the 
1A~ rv Indian no more directly than any other tax levied on the 
seller's total enterprise. Federal policy is not designed to -----------immunize Indians from normal business costs. (2) Appl also 
argues that the state tax directly interfers with tribal self-
government because it taxes Indians and because it would 
conflict with any tax that the tribe itself might levy. This 
argument is partly answered in the previous paragraph. The rest 
of the argument has no merit because there is no clear 
indication either in Warren or in the briefs now filed that the 
challenged tax is a sales tax on the buyer. Rather, the tax 
falls on the seller. The forthcoming decision in Confederated 
Tribes, supra, makes clear that state taxes are not invalid iust 
because its economic incidence is on Indians. Instead, state 
taxes are invalid when they (1) reduce the revenues of the tribe 
itself, (2) place Indian business at a competitive disadvantage, 
and ( 3 ) inject state law into a transaction within the 
reservation that the Indians have chosen to subject to their own 
laws. See Third Draft of Confederated Tribes at 19-20. The 
second two factors are the most important, and neither is 
present in this case. 
Summary 
Warren Trading Post held that the pervasive federal 
regulations governing trading with the Indians on a reservation 
preempted the gross receipts tax that Arizona was trying to 
assess against an on-reservation Indian trader for the privilege 
of doing business within the state. Warren should control the 
decision in both of these cases. 
1. White Mountain: Arizona cannot levy road use taxes 
on petr Pinetop's activity because: (a) the federal regulations 
of Indian logging with which petr Pinetop must comply are just 
as pervasive as (arguably, more pervasive than) the regulations 
in Warren; (b) the state seeks to tax Pinetop for activities 
conducted entirely within the reservation and upon Indian roads 
for which the state has no responsibility. Reverse. 
2. Central Machinery: Arizona can levy a business 
privilege (gross receipts) tax on appl Central Machinery 
because: (a) Central Machinery is not subject to the system of 
federal regulation involved in Warren since it is not "in the 
business of Indian trading on reservations," Warren, 380 U.S. at 
690; (b) the transaction from which the tax arises was a one-
time sale not subject to pervasive federal regulation; (c) a tax 
that falls on the non-Indian seller and does no more than raise 
his selling price by increasing his costs of business does not 
interfer with tribal self-government. Affirm. 
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Re: 78-1177 -White Mountain Apache Tribe 
v. Bracker 
Dear Thurgood: 
In due course I will circulate a dissent. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 





No. 78-1177: White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker 
Mr. Justice, 
Mr. Justice Marshall now has circulated the majority 
opinion in this companion to Central Machinery Co. v. Ariz. State 
Tax Comm'n, No. 78-1604. You are in the majority in this case, 
but not in Central Machinery. Mr. Justice Stewart has written 
that he will write a dissent in Central Machinery; he probably 
will write the dissent in this case as well. 
This is a much better opinion than the one circulated in 
Central Machinery. It is well put together, well-written, and 
sets forth a good summary of the Indian preemption cases. Still, 
the draft seems simply to throw up its hands and says that 
decisions in this area must be ad hoc. And the reasons it 
advances to show that these state taxes would interfere with 
federal regulation of Indian lumbering do not immediately strike 
one as overwhelming. 
Since--as I suggested in my 15 Mar. note on Central 
Machinery--you probably will need to write a short opinion 
explaining why you distinguish these two Indian tax cases, I 
recommend you write to Mr. Justice Marshall that (a) you presently 
intend to vote with the maiority in this case only, but (b) you 
will not decide whether to join his opinion until you have 
considered what--if anything--you yourself should write to explain 
your unique view of the two cases. 
Greg 
2. 
March 20, 1980 
78-1177 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker 
Dear Thurgooo: 
I voted with the maiority in this case, and think: 
you have written a fine opinion. In Central Machinery, I was 
in dissent - the only Justice to be for the Indians in one 
and aqainst them in the other. 
I therefore probably will write explaininq why I 
view these cases differently. Althouqh my present intention 
is to join you in this case, I will await other writing -
incluoing the dissent in Central Machinery - before decidinq 
finally whether to join your opinion. 
Mr. Justice Marshall • 
lfp/ss 















JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~ttp"rtlttt "Jonrf Gf tqt ~ttit:t~ ~htftg 
'~hts!pn.gtcn. ~. QJ. 211.?>!~ 
March 24, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1177 - White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
.- . 
.;§upTtmt <!Jottrl of tip~ 'Jlni:tt~ .§rnt~s 
~na££Jri:n:gtmt. ~. <!J. 21lc?J!.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE March 780 
Re: No. 78-1177 - White Mountain Apache Tribe 
v. Bracker 
Dear Thurgood, 
I have read your proposed opinion and agree with a good 
deal of it. 
Part III is the dispositive section, and I agree with 
its analysis and result. My sole concern is the implication 
of your statement on page 14 that "it is undisputed that the 
economic burden of these taxes will ultimately fall on the 
Tribe." In Confederated Tribes, the Court will uphold a 
State tax on non-Indians even though the economic burden of 
which falls on the Tribe. Could this statement be omitted 
or rephrased? 
I have some difficulties with Part II and in light of 
Part III, wonder about its necessity. As you note, generali-
zations in Indian law are treacherous. I am concerned that 
some of the broader statements in Part II, taken out of con-
text, might be applied in an inappropriate way in future 
cases. For example, at page 7 you quote Br~an v. Itasca 
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), for the propos~t~on that "Indians 
stand in a special relation to the Federal Government from 
which the States are excluded unless Congress has manifested 
a clear purpose to •.• allow States to treat Indians as 
part of the general community." This statement was unexcep-
tionable in Bryan, where the question was whether Pub. L. 
280 permitted the States to tax Indian property which was 
clearly exempt from taxation under Moe and McClanahan. It 
makes sense in this context to say that State taxat~on is 
excluded unless Congress has permitted it. But it is ques-
tionable whether the same rule applies in cases involving 
State taxation of non-Indians doing business on the reserva-
tion. Indeed, Moe seems to the contrary, since the State 
was there permitced to tax non-Indian purchasers from Indian-
operated reservation smoke shops despite the absence of 
federal statutes clearly intended to allow State taxation. 
-2-
Similarly, you state at page 7 that the Court has 
"re j ected the proposition that in order to find a particular 
state law to have been pre-empted by operation of federal 
law, an express congressional statement to that effec t is 
required." This is certainly true in some cases, such as 
cases involving only Indians or cases involving relations 
between non-Indians and Indians on the reservation. It is 
not true, however, in cases involving relations between non-
Indians and Indians off the reservation . Rather , "[a]bsent 
express federal law to the contrary , Indians going beyond 
reservation boundaries have generally been held sub j ect to 
nondiscriminatory state law •.•• " Mescalero Apache Tribe 
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 148-149 (1973). 
At page 8 you cite Moe for the proposition that 
"' automatic exemptions as a matter of constitutional 
unusual." At least the clear implication in Moe was 




Finally, you say at page 8 that in the case of non-
Indians conducting activities on the reservation , the pre-
emption inquiry is "designed to determine whether , in the 
specific context , the exercise of state authority would 
undermine some federal policy ." While I agree that federa l 
policies are relevant , this statement might suggest an in-
quiry into the broad policies of encouraging Indian self-
government and strengthening reservation economies without 
due attention to the specific language and provisions of the 
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.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
-
~ttprtmt <!feud cf t~t ~b ,;g;tait.e 
11ht.eltingfctt, ~. QJ. 2ll,?J~~ 
March 28, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1177 -White Mountain Apache Tribe 
v. Bracker 
Dear Byron: 
Thank you for your comments on my proposed op1n1on 
in this case. I think that I can accommodate almost 
all of your concerns. 
With respect to the statement on p. 14, you are of 
course correct in suggesting that the fact that the 
economic burden falls on the Tribe is not 
dispositive. It is, however, relevant, as Warren 
Trading Post makes clear. My reference to the 
economic burden was intended to be read in 
conjunction with the immediately following sentence, 
which demonstrates that it is not the economic burden 
itself, but the Federal regulatory scheme in general, 
that leads to the result we reach. Would your concern 
be met if I added a footnote stating explicitly that 
the incidence of the economic burden is not 
controlling and distinguishing Moe and/or 
Confederated Tribes? 
I do believe that Part II is necessary in order to 
set up a framework with which to approach the case. 
However, I am willing to adopt in full three of your 
four suggestions by (1) deleting the quotation from 
Bryan on p. 7; (2) adding a footnote on p. 7 to quote 
the statement in Mescalero with respect to Indians 
going beyond reservation boundaries; and (3) altering 
the sentence immediately before Part III to conclude, 
"whether, in the specific context, the exercise of 
state authority would violate federal law." 
CHAM BER S OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.:§npumc Qf!lttrl (lf tlp~ 1iUriftb .;§htlt.l:l 
2.1Iattlyi:ttgton. ~. <!J. 20,?>t~ 
March 31, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1177 - White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker 
Dear Thurgood, 
Thank you for your letter of March 
28. Your suggested changes for the most 
part satisfy me and I join your opinion. 
Although I would have preferred that you 
eliminate the word '' a utomatic" from the 
statement in footnote 18, I shall leave 




Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
- 2 -
I do not agree that the statement in footnote 18 
in Moe--referring to "automatic exemptions as a 
inat'£"er of constitutional law"--should be read as 
broadly as you suggest. Certainly the language of the 
footnote does not extend that far. Moreover, a number 
of our cases recognize the principle that the 
exercise of state authority over the reservation may 
be impermissible, not because it is "preempted" in 
the ordinary sense, but because it infringes on 
tribal self-government. See Williams v. Lee and the 
cases cited on p. 6 on my proposed opinion. This 
principle, I think, is difficult to reconcile with 
the view that "automatic" or "constitutional" 





Mr. Justice White 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-1177 
White Mountain Apache Tribe! y • • • ~ A..-
et al., Petitioners, On W nt of Certwran to the .J 
Comt of Appeals of Ari.. · ~ - - 7 
R b M B
v. k 
1 
zona, Division One. ~'
o ert . rae er et a . 
[March -, 1980] 
Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we are once again called upon to consider the 
extent of Rtate authority over the activities of non-Indians 
engaged in commerce on an Indian reservation. The State 
of Arizona sePks to apply its motor carrier license and use fuel 
taxes to petitioner Pinetop Logging Company (Pinetop), an 
enterprise consisting of two non-Indian corporations author-
ized to do business in Arizona and operating solely on the Fort 
Apache Reservation. Pinetop and petitioner White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe contend that the taxes are pre-empted by 
federal law or, alternatively, that they represent an unlawful 
infriugement on tribal self-government. The Arizona Court 
of Appeals rejected petitioners' claims. We hold that the 
taxes are pre-empted by federal law, and we therefore reverse. 
I 
The 6,500 members of petitioner White Mountain Apache 
Tribe reside on the Fort Apache Reservation in a moun-
tainous and forested region of northeastern Arizona.1 The 
1 The Fort Apache Reservation was originally established as the White 
Mountain Reservation by an Executive Order ~ignecl by Pr~iclent Grant 
on Novemb<>r , 1871. Dy tlw Act of Congre~s of .June 7, lR9i, 30 Stat. 
64, the White Mountain Reservation was divided into the Fort Apache 
and San Carlos Reservations. 
, 
'i'8-ll77-0PINION 
~ WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE v. BRACKER 
Tribe is organized under a constitution approved by the Secre .. 
tary of the Interior under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 
U. S. C. § 476. The revenue used to fund the Tribe's govern-
mental programs is derived almost exclusively from tribal 
enterprises. Of these enterprises, timber operations have 
proved by far the most important, accounting for over 90% 
of the Tribe's total annual profits.2 
The Fort Apache Reservation occupies over 1,650,000 acres, 
including 720,000 acres of commercial forest. Approximately 
300,000 acres are used for the harvesting of timber on a 
"sustained yield" basis, permitting each area to be cut 
every 20 years without endangering the forest's continuing 
productivity. Under federal law, timber on reservation land 
is owned by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe and 
cannot be harvested for sale without the consent of Congress. 
Acting under the authority of 25 CFR § 141.6 and the tribal 
constitution, and with the specific approval of the Secretary 
of the Interior, the Tribe in 1964 organized the Fort Apache 
Timber Company (FATCO), a tribal enterprise that man~ 
ages, harvests, processes, and sells timber. F ATCO, which 
eonducts all of its activities on the reservation, was created 
with the aid of federal funds. It employs about 300 tribal 
members. 
The United States has entered into contracts with FATCO, 
authorizing it to harvest timber pursuant to regulations of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. FATCO has itself contracted 
with six logging companies, including Pinetop, which perform 
certain operations that F ATCO could not carry out as eco-
nomically on its own.3 Since it first entered into agreements 
with FATCO in 1969, Pinetop has been required to fell trees, 
eut them to the correct size, and transport them to F ATCO's 
sawmill in return for a contractually specified fee. Pinetop 
2 In 1973, for example, tribal enterprises showed a net profit of 
$1 ,667,091, $1,508,713 of which was attributable to timber operations. 
3 FATCO initially attempted to perform t~ome of its own logging and 
h~uling o,pe:ration:s but found itself 1.\nable to do these tvsks ecOiwmiciilly, 
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employs approximately 50 tribal members. Its activities, 
performed solely on the Fort Apache Reservation, are subject 
to extensive federal control. 
In 1971 respondents 4 sought to impose on Pinetop the two 
state taxes at issue here. The first, a motor carrier license 
tax, is assessed on " [ e] very common motor carrier of property 
and every contract motor carrier of property." Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 40-641 (A) (1). Pinetop is a "contract motor 
carrier of property" since it is engaged in "the transportation 
by motor vehicle of property, for compensation, on any 
public highway." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 40-601 (A) (7) . The 
motor carrier license tax amounts to 2.5 % of the carrier's 
gross receipts. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40--641 (A) (I). The 
second tax at issue is an excise or use fuel tax designed " [ f] or 
the purpose of partially compensating the state for the use 
of its highways." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1552. The tax 
amounts to eight cents per gallon of diesel fuel used "in the 
propulsion of a motor vehicle on any highway within this 
State." lb'id. The use fuel tax was assessed on Pinetop 
because it uses diesel fuel to propel its vehicles on the state 
highways within the Fort Apache Reservation. 
Pinetop paid the taxes under protest,G and then brougU 
suit in state court, asserting that under federal law the taxes 
could not lawfully be imposed on logging activities conducted 
exclusively within the reservation or on hauling activities on 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal roads.0 The Tribe agreed 
4 Respondents are the Arizona Highway Department, the Arizona High-
way Commission, and individual members of each entity. 
5 Between November 1971 and May 1976 Pinetop paid under protest 
$19,114.59 in use fuel taxf's and $14,701.42 iu motor carrier J icPn~f' taxes . 
Since that time it has continued to pay taxes pending the outcomE> of this 
case. Refund litigation is pending in state court with rPspPct to the five 
other non-Indian contractors Pmployed by the Tribe, and that litigation 
has been stayed pending tlw outcome of this suit. 
6 For purposes of this action petitioners have concedPd Pinetop's liability 
for both motor carrier license and use fuel taxes att ributable to travel on 
state Il~hways within tfl:e l!esel:vatm. Pinet@]?· I1as maintained record> 
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to reimburse Pinetop for any tax liability incurred as a result 
of its on-reservation business :11ctivities, and the Tribe inter-
vened in the action as a plaintiff.7 
Both petitioners and respondents moved for summary judg-
ment on the issue of the applicability of the two taxes to 
Pinetop. Petitioners submitted supporting affidavits from 
the manager of F ATCO, the head forester of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, and the Chairman of the White Mountain 
Apache Tribal Council; respondents offered no affidavits dis-
puting the factual assertions. by petitioners' affiants. ·The 
trial court awarded summary judgment to respondents,8 and 
the petitioners appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' pre-emption claim. 
585 P. 2d 891 (1978). Purporting to apply the test set forth 
in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. lv'elson, 350 U. S. 497 
( 1956), the court held that the taxes did not conflict with 
federal regulation of tribal timber, that the federal interest 
was not so dominant as to preclude assessment of the chal-
lenged state taxes, and that the federal regulatory scheme did 
not "occupy the field." " The court also concluded that the 
state taxes would not unlawfully infringe on tribal self-
government. The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. We granted certiorari. 
-u.s.- (1980). 
of fuel attributable to tra.vel on those highways, and computations would 
evidently be made in order to allocate a portion of the gro~s receipts tax-
able under the motor carrier license tax to state highways. 
7 When Pinetop contracted to undertake timber opera tious for F ATCO 
in 1969, both Pinetop and FATCO believed that it would not be required 
to pay state taxes. After re~pondents assessed the taxes at issue, FATCO 
agreed to pay them to avoid the lo~s of Pinetop's services 
8 After the trial court entered summary judgment on the issue of tl1e 
applicabihty of the state taxes, the case procPeded to tnal on the state-
Jaw issue of the manner of ca.leulating the motor vehicle license tax. FinaT 
judgment was entered for respondents on all 1ssues after trw!. The Ari-
zona Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Superior Court on the-
calcu.latiQn of the motor vehicle licen~e tax. 585 P. 2d 891, 900 (1978). 
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II 
Although "[g] eneralizations on this subject have be.: 
come ... treacherous," Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U. S. 145, 148 ( 1973), our decisions establish several basic 
principles with respect to the boundaries between State regu..: 
Iatory authority and tribal self-government. Long ago the 
Court departed from Mr·. Chief Justice Marshall's view that 
"the laws of [a State] can have no force" within reservation 
boundaries, Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832) .9· 
See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai 1'ribes, 425 U. S. 463, 481-483~ 
(1976); New York ex ret. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496. 
(1946); Utah & Northern Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28 (1885). 
At the same time we have recognized that the Indian tribes 
retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and 
their territory." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 
(1975). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313; 
323 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 
55-56 ( 1978). As a result, there is no rigid rule by which to ' 
resolve the question whether a particular state law may be· 
applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members. The 
status of the tribes has been described as "an anomalous one 
and of complex character," for despite their partial assimila-
tion into American culture, the tribes have retained "a semi-
independent position ... not as States, not as nations, not as 
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a sepa-
rate people, with the power of regulating their internal and 
social relations, and thus far not brought under the la.ws of 
the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided." 
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 174 
(1973), quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-
382 (1886) . 
9 The shift in approach is discussed in Williams v Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 
219 (1959); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 71- 75 
(1962); and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comrnissiou, 411 :u. S. 
164, 172 '(1973) . 
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Congress has broad power to regulate tribal a.ffairs under 
the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See United 
States v. Wheeler, supra, 435 U. S., at 322-323. This congres-
sional authority and the "semi-independent position" of 
Indian tribes have given rise to two independent but related 
barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over 
tribal reservations and members. First, , the exercise of such 
authority may be pre-empted by federal law. See, e. g., 
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 
U.S. 685 (1965); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 
supra. Second, it may unlawfully infringe "on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them." Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1958). See also 
Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, - U. S. -, -
(1979); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976); Ken-
nerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971) . 
The two barriers are independent because either, standing 
alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplica-
ble to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal 
members. They are related, however, in two important ways. 
The right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent 
on and subject to the broad power of Congress. Even so. tr:a-
ditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply 
engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an 
important "backdrop," McClanahan v. Arizona State· Tax 
Comm'n, supra, 411 U. S., at 172, against which vague or 
ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured. 
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it 
generally unhelpful to ar>ply to federal enactments regulating 
Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have 
emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reservations are 
not States, and the differences in the form and nature of their 
sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions of 
pre-emption that are properly applied to the other. The tra-
dition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal 
members must inform the determination wheth€r the exercise 
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of state authority has been pre-empted by operation of federal 
law. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, 425 U. S., at 
475. As we have repeatedly recognized, this tradition is re-
flected and encouraged in a number of congressional enac~ 
ments demonstrating a firm fe~eral policy of promoting tribal 
self-sufficiency and economic development.10 Ambiguities in 
federal law have been construed generously in order to com.; 
port with these traditional notions of sovereignty and with 
the federal policy of en~ouraging tribal independence. See 
McClanahan v. Arizona State 1'a:r Cornrn'n, supra, 411 U. S., 
at 174-175. and 11. 13. \Ve have thus rejected thP proposition 
that in order to find a particular state law to have been pre-: 
empted by operation of federal law. all express congressional 
statement to that effect is required.' 1 Warren Trading Post 
do. v. Arizona State Ta;r Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965). At 
the same time any applicable regulatory interest of the State 
must be given weight, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
1° For example, the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 
et seq., ;;tates: "It i;; hereby declared to be the policy of Congres:; ... 
to help develop and utilize Indian resource:;, both physical and human, to 
a point where the Indian::; will fully exercise re~ponsibility for the utiliza-
tion and management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a 
standard of living from their own productive efforts com11arable to that 
enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities." Similar policies 
underlie the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assi;;tunce Act, 25 
U. S. C. § 450 et seq., as well as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 
25 U. S. C. 461 et seq., whose "intent and purpose ... was 'to rehabilitate 
the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance to develop the initia-
tive destroyed by a. century of oppression and paternalism.' " M escalem 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 152 (1973), quoting H. R. Rep. 
No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Ses:;., 6 (1934). See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1979) . Cf. Gros:>, Indian Self-Determmation and 
Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal Policy, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 
11\)5 (1978). 
n In the ca::;r of "Indian!'; going bryond :,;tatr boundarie:-;, '' howrver, I 
"a nondi::;criminatory state law '' i,.; genrrally applicable in tlw nb:;('JH'r of 
"pxprr:ss fPderal law to thP contrary.'' Mescalem Apache 1'ribl' v Jones, 
411 u. . 14.~, 148-149. 
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Comm'-n, supra, 411 U. R., a.t 171, and "automatic exemptions 
'as a matter of constitutional law' " arc unusual. Moe v. 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, suprn, 425 U. R .. at 481. n. 18. 
When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at 
issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regu-
latory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest 
in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest. See 
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, 425 U. S., at 480~ 
481; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra. 
More difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts 
authority over the conduct of non- fnclians engaging in activ-
ity on the reservation. In such cases we have examined the 
language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms 
of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions 
(Jf sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions 
of tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on 
mechanical or absolute conceptions of State or tribal sover-
eignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the 
nature of the State, Federal, and tribal interests at stake, an 
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, 
the exercise of state authority would violate federal law. , 
Compare Warren 1'rading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, supra, and Williams v. Lee, supra .. " ·ith Moe v. 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, and Thomas v. Gay, 169 
U. S. 264 (1898). Cf. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, supra, 411 U.S., at 171; Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, trnpra, 411 U. S., at 148. 
III 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the respondents' 
claim that they may, consistent with federal law, impose the 
contested motor vehicle license and use fuel taxes on the 
logging and hauling operations of petitioner Pinetop. At the 
eutset we observe that the Federal Government's regulation of. 
the h:arvestin_g of Indian timber is comp1·ehensive. ..That reg~ 
•' 
. , . 
. , 
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ulation takes the form of Acts of Congress, detailed regula-
tions promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, and day-
to-day supervision by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Under 
25 U.S. C. ~§ 405-407, the Secretary of the Interior is granted 
broad authority over the sale of timber on the reservation.J 2 
Timber on Indian land may be sold only with the consent of 
the Secretary, and the proceeds from any such sales, less 
administrative expenses incurred by the Federal Government, 
are to be used for the benefit of the Indians or transferred to 
the Indian owner. Sales of timber must "be based upon a 
consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian 
owner and his heirs." 25 U. S. C. § 406. The statute specifies 
the factors which the Secretary must consider in making that 
determination.13 In order to assure the continued produc-
1 2 Frd<>ral policir,; with rr~prct. to tribal timlwr hav<' a long history. 
In United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591 (1874), and Pine River Logging & 
Improvement Co. v. United States, 186 U . S. 279 (1902) , the Court held 
that tribal mrmbers had no right to ~I'll timber ou reservation land unless 
the sale wa~; related to the improvement of the laud . At the same time 
the Court interpreted the governing statute as designed "to permit deserv-
ing Indian~. who had no other sufficient mean:> of o;upport, to cut ... 
a limited quantit~r of ... timber ... and to usr the proceeds for their 
support . .. , provided that 10 percent of thr gross proceedo; should go 
to the stumpage or poor fund of the tribe from which the old, sick, and 
otherwisr helples~ might be ;;upported." /d., at 285-286. 
The Attorney Grnrral interprE:>ted the holding in Cook to mean that 
Indians had no right to re,;ervation timber. S!'r 19 Op. Atty. G<.>n. 194 
(1888). This intrrpreta.tion was overturned by Congi'e&"> by Act of 
June 25, 1910, ch. 431, 36 Stat . 855, as amended, 25 U . S. C. § 407, and 
also repudiated in United States v. Shoshone Indians, 304 U . S. 111 (1938). 
Thus, as the Court summarized in United States v. Algoma Lumber Co ., 
305 U. S. 415 ( 1939), "under .. . established principle:> applicable to 
land reservations created for the benefit of the Indian tribes, the Indians 
are beneficial owners of the land and the timber standing upon it and of 
the proreeds of their sale, subject to the plenary 11ower of control by the 
United Statr:::, to br rxrrcisrd for the bPneJH and protrction of thr Indians." 
See 25 U . S. C. § 196; United States v. Mitchell,- U. S. - (19k0) . 
1 ~1 Thoi'lr fartor~ inrln<lr " (1) the :-;tate of growth of t hP timbrr :mel 
the need for maintaining the productive capacity of the land for the bene-
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tivity of timber-producing land on tribal reservations, timber 
on unaJlotted lands "may be sold in accordance with the 
principles of sustained yield." 25 U. S. C. § 407. The Sec-
retary is granted power to determine the disposition of the 
proceeds from timber sales. He is authorized lio promulgate 
· regulations for the operation and management of Indian for-
estry unitS. 25 U.S. C. §'466. 
Acting pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has promul-
. ·gated a detailed set of regulations to govern the harvesting 
and sale of tribal timber. Among the stated objectives of the 
regulations is the "development of Indian forests by the 
Indian people for the purpose of promoting self-sustaining 
communities, lio the end that the Indians may receive from 
their own property not only the stumpage value, but also the 
benefit of whatever profit it is capable of yielding and what. 
ever labor the Indians are qualified to perform." 25 CFR 
§ 141.3 (a)(3) . The regulations cover a wide variety of 
matters: for example, they restrict clear-cutting, § 141.5; 
establish comprehensive guidelines for the sale of timber, 
§ 141.7; regulate the advertising of timber sales, §§ 141.8-
141.9; specify the manner in which bids may be accepted and 
rejected, § 141.11; describe the circumstances in which con. 
tracts may be entered into, §§ 141.12-141.13; require the 
approval of all contracts by the Secretary, § 141.13; call fol' 
timber cutting permits to be approved by the Secretary, 
· § 141.19; specify fire protective measures, § 141.21; and pro .. 
vide a board of administrative appeals, § 141.23. Tribes are 
expressly authorized lio establish commercial enterprises for 
the harvesting and logging of tribal timber. § 141.6. 
Under these regulations, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
·exercises literally daily supervision over the harvesting and 
ftt of the owner and his heirs, (2) the highest and the be:>t u::;e of the land, 
including the advisability and practicality of devoting it to other u~;e::; for 
the benefit of the owner and his heirs, and (3) the pre~:>ent and future 
financlai needi of the owner and his heirs," 25 lJ. S. C. § 406. 
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management of tribal timber. In the present case, contracts 
between F ATCO and Pinetop must be approved by the 
Bureau; indeed, the record shows that some of those contracts 
were drafted by employees of the Federal Government. 
Bureau employees regulate the cutting, hauling, and marking 
of timber by FATCO and Pinetop. The Bureau decides such 
matters as how much timber will be cut, which trees will be 
felled , which roads are to be used, which hauling equipment 
Pinetop should employ, the speeds at which logging equip-
ment may travel, and the width, length, height, and weight 
of loads. 
The Secretary has also promulgated detailed regulations 
governing the roads developed by the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs. 25 CFR Part 162. BIA roads are open to "lfJree pub-
lic use." § 162.8. Their administration and maintenance are 
funded by the Federal Government, with contributions from 
the Indian tribes. §§ 162.6-162.6a. On the Fort Apache 
Reservation the Forestry Department of the Bureau has re-
quired F ATCO and its contractors, including Pinetop, to 
repair and maintain existing BIA and tribal roads and in some 
cases to construct new logging roads. Substantial sums have 
been spent for these purposes. In its federally approved con-
tract with F ATCO, Pinetop has agreed to construct new roads 
and to repair existing ones. A high percentage of Pinetop's 
receipts are expended for those purposes, and it has main-
tained separate personnel and equipment to carry out a 
variety of tasks relating to road maintenance. 
In these circumstances we agree with petitioners that the 
federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to preclude the 
additional burdens sought to be imposed in this case. Re-
spondents seek to apply their motor vehicle hcense and use 
fuel taxes on Pinetop for operations that are conducted solely 
on Bureau aiH] tribal roads within the reservation.11 There is 
11 In oral ar~~:nmrnt ronnsrl for respondrnt,; apprarrd to eoncrdt• that t,Jl<' 
a~sertcd state tnxes could not lawfully lw a~:;erted on tribal mad~ and 
'· 
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no room for these taxes in the comprehensive federal regula-
tory scheme. In a variety of ways, the assessment of state 
taxes would obstruct federal policies. And equally important, 
respondents have been unable to identify any regulatory 
function or service performed by the State that would justify 
the assessment of taxes for activities on Bureau and tribal 
roads within the reservation. 
At the most general level, the taxes would threaten the 
overriding federal objecti-ve of guaranteeing Indians that they 
will "receive ... the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] 
is capable of yielding .... " 25 CFR § 141.3 (a) (3). Under-
lying the federal regulatory program rests a policy of assuring 
that the profits derived from timber sales will inure to the 
benefit of the Tribe, subject orily to administrative expenses 
incurred by the Federal Government. That objective is part 
of the general federal policy of encouraging tribes "to revital-
ize their self-government" and to assume control over their-
11business and economic affairs." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, supra, 411 U. S., at 151. The imposition of the taxes 
at issue would undermine that policy in a context in which the 
Federal Government has undertaken to regulate the most 
minute details of timber production and expressed a finn 
desire that the Tribes should retain the benefits derived from 
the harvesting and sale of reservation timber. 
In addition, the taxes would undermine the Secretary's abil-
ity to make the wide range of determinations committed to 
his authority concerning the setting of fees and rates with 
respect to the harvesting and sale of tribal timber. The Sec-
wa:s unwilling to defend the contrary conclu:sion of the court below, which 
made no di~tinction between Bureau and tribal road:; under state and 
federal law. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-37. Contrary to reHpondeuto; ' posi-
tion throughout the litigation and in their brief in th1s Court, counsel 
limited his argument to a content.ion that the taxe,; could be aH:sertrd on 
the road:; of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Ibid. For purpo,;r:; of fedrral 
pre-emption, however, WP :;ee no ba.-;i;:; , and re:spondent ~:< pomt to none, for 
di:;tinguishing between road:; maintained by the Tribe and -aoad,; ruamtai:ne(t 
bQ' the B~1o1:eau of lnd.i;lU Affair~ 
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retary reviews and approves the terms of the Tribe's agree-
ments with its contractors, sets fees for services rendered to 
the tribe by the Federal Government, and determines stump-
age rates for timber to be paid to the Tribe. Most notably 
in reviewing or writing the terms of the contracts between 
FATCO and its contractors, federal agents must predict the 
amount and determine the proper allocation of all business 
expenses, including fuel costs. The assessment of state taxes 
would throw additional factors into the federal calculus, 
reducing tribal revenues and diminishing the profitability of 
the enterprise for potential contractors. 
Finally, the imposition of state taxes would adversely 
affect the Tribe's ability to comply with the sustained-
yield management policies imposed by federal law. Substan-
tial expenditures are paid out by the Federal Government, the 
Tribe, and its contractors in order to undertake a wide variety 
of measures to ensure the continued productivity of the forest. 
These measures include reforestration , fire control, wildlife 
promotion, road improvement, safety inspections, and general 
policing of the forest. The expenditures are largely paid for 
out of tribal r·evenues, which are in turn derived almost 
exclusively from the sale of timber. The imposition of state 
taxes on F ATCO's contractors would eft'ectively diminish the 
amount of those revenues and thus leave the Tribe and its 
contractors with reduced sums with which to pay out federally 
required expenses. 
As noted above, this is not a case in which the State seeks 
to assess taxes in return for governmental functions it per-
forms for those on whom the taxes fall. Nor have respondents 
been able to identify a legitimate regulatory interest served 
by the taxes it seeks to impose. They refer to a general desire 
to raise revenue, but we are unable to discern a responsibility 
or service that justifies the assertion of taxes imposed for 
on-reservation operations conducted solely on tribal and 
Bureau of Indian Affairs roads. Pinetop's business in Arizona 
is conducted solely on the Fort Apache Reservation. Though 
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at least the use fuel tax purports to "compensat[e] the state 
for the use of its highways," Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1552, 
no such compensatory purpose is present here. The roads at 
issue have been built, main'tained, and policed exclusively by 
the Federal Government, the Tribe, and its contractors. We 
do not believe that respondents' generalized interest in raising 
revenue is in this context sufficient to permit its proposed 
intrusion into the federal r·egulatory scheme with respect to 
the harvesting and sale of tribal timber. 
Respondents' argument is reduced to a claim that they may 
assess taxes on non-Indians engaged in commerce on the res-
ervation whenever there is no express congressional statement 
to the contrary. That is simply not the law. In a number 
of cases we have held that state authority over non-Indians 
acting on tribal reserva.tions is pre-empted even though Con-
gress has offered no explicit statement on the subject. See 
Warren Trading Post, supr.a; Williams v. Lee, supra; Ken-
nerly v. District Court of Montana, supra. The Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical 
component to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains 
highly relevant to the pre-emption inquiry; though the reser-
vation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important fac-
tor to weigh in determining whether state authority has ex-
ceeded the permissible limits. · "'The cases in this Court have 
consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments 
over their reservatior)s.' " United States v. M azurie, supra, 
419 U. S., at 558, quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 223 
( 1959). Moreover, it is undisputed that the economic bur-
den of the asserted taxes will ultimately fall on the Tribe.1 " 
15 or rour~e, the fart that thr rconomic burdrn of the tax fallx on the 
TribE~ doe:; not b~- it~elf mean that tlw fax i,; pre-empfPd, a~ Moe\'. Salish 
& Koote1uri Tribes , 425 U. S. 463 (19i6), maims rle<tl'. Our deci~ion 
toda~· ic: ba,;rd on the pn•-Pmptiw rffect of thr romprrhrn~ivP fedrral 
regulatory ~chcmr, which, like thn.t. in Warren Tmdi11(1 Post ('o . \'.Arizona 
State 'I'ax Comm'n, :3SO U. S. 685 (1965), leave~ no room for the adcti-
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Where, as here, the Federal Government has undertaken com-
prehensive regulation of the harvesting and sale of tribal 
timber, where a number of the policies underlying the federal 
regulatory scheme are threatened by the taxes respondents 
seek to impose, and where respondents are unable to justify 
the taxes except in terms of a generalizer! interest in raising 
revenue, we believe that the proposed exercise of state author-
ity is impermissible.10 
Both the reasoning and result in this case follow naturally 
from our unanimous decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v. 
Arizona Tax Commission, supra. There the State of Arizona 
sought to impose a "gross proceeds" tax on a non-Indian com-
pany which conducted a retail trading business on the Navajo 
Indian Reservation. Referring to the tradition of sovereign 
power over the reservation, the Court held that the "compre-
hensive federal regulation of Indian traders" prohibited the 
assessment of the attempted taxes. No federal statute by its 
terms precluded the assessment of state tax. Nonetheless, 
the "detailed regulations," specifying "in the most minute 
fashion," id., at 689. the licensing and regulation of Indian 
traders, were held "to show that Congress has taken the 
business of Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand 
that no room remains for sta.te laws imposing additional bur-
dens upon traders." !d., at 690. The imposition of those 
burdens, we held, "could disturb and disarrange the statutory 
16 Hrspondents al,;o rontPnd thnt. tlw tnxes arr nuthorized by the Buek 
Act, 4 U. S. C. § 105 et seq., and the Ha.ydm-Cartwright Act, 4 U. S. C. 
§ 104. ln Warren Tmding Post Co. v. United States, 380 U.S. 685, 691, 
n. 18 (1965), we t>quarely held that the Buck Act did not apply to 
Indian reservations, and re~pondents pre;;ent no sufficient rea:>on for U8 
to depart from that holding. We agree with petitioner::; that the Hayden-
Cartwright Act, which authorizes state taxe:s "on United State;; military 
and other reservations," was not det>igned to overcome the otlwrwh;e pre-
emptive effect of federal regulation of tribal timber. We need not reach 
the more general question whether the Hayden-Cartwright Act applies to 
Indian reservation::; at all. 
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plan'' because the economic burden of the state taxes would 
eventually be passed on to the Indians themselves. We 
referred to the fact that the Tribe had been "largely free to 
run the reservation and its affairs without state control, a 
policy which has automatically relieved Arizona of all burdens 
for carrying on those same responsibilities." Ibid. And we 
emphasized that "since federal legisla.tion has left the State 
with no duties or responsibilities respecting the reservation 
Indians, we cannot believe that Congress intended to leave to 
the State the privilege of levying this tax." /d., at 691. The 
present case, we conclude, is in all relevant respects indis" 
tinguishable from Warren Trading Post. 
The decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
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